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Retrieving the Baby 
Feminist Theory and Organic Bodies 
BY BEV THIELE 
The feminism of the pseudo- 
man is passe.. . . Birth is a sub- 
ject and object of an integrative 
feminist philosophy. (O'Brien 
1981,91-92) 
. . . [T] here is no compelling rea- 
son to assume that the natural 
is, in essence, essentialist and 
that the social is, in essence, 
constructionist . . . it may be time 
to ask whether essences can 
change and whether construc- 
tions can be normative. (Fuss 6) 
An understanding of the integ- 
rity ofbeing and knowing, sense 
and sensuality, recognizes that 
mind cannot exist without the 
body, and our bodies cannot 
live without our minds.. .. T o  
make sense we have to make 
knowledge with our experience, 
and, if, yes, forms matter, it is 
also true and significant for our 
worldly desires, that matter 
forms. (Brodribb 147) 
Introduction 
Put bluntly, the question 1 want to 
explore here is "how matter forms." 
How might feminists recognize, use- 
fully understand, and theorize about 
our organic existence: about the body 
as biological entity-as matter-as 
well as social construct-as form? 
References to biology, to our organic 
existence, conventionally raise the 
hackles on good feminist necks, and 
with good reason. It properly in- 
vokes concerns about biological de- 
terminism: "Anti-feminist forces of 
darkness and eviln have historically 
justified women'ssubordination with 




reference to our particular 
bodies and biology. 
Our "special nature" 
is invariably deduced 
from our particular 
reproductive capacity. 
reference to our particular (and ap- 
parently peculiar) bodies and . biol- 
ogy. Our "special nature" is invari- 
ably deduced from our particular 
reproductive capacity (or, in their 
terms, "function"). And it is still the 
case that we need to be wary of the 
way determinist readings of biology 
are suggested by diverse projects 
aimed at demonstrating that wom- 
en's bodies are more problematic 
than (and thus inferior to) men's 
bodies.' Nonetheless it is time to 
question feminist assumptions that 
biology necessarily invokesdetermin- 
ism and essentialism. 
In the past 20 years, the persistent 
association of woman with body has 
encouraged feminists to pursue a 
strategy of disassociation and disa- 
vowal. FollowingAnn Oakley's early 
rebuttal of biological determinism, 
feminists mostly invest in some ver- 
sion of social constructionism, and 
those who stray too far face quick 
condemnation as essentialists. Gen- 
erally we feminists have argued that 
gender and not sex is the crucial 
variable in sexual politics; that it is 
not the fact of biology (or biological 
difference) which matters, but the 
cultural meaning given that differ- 
ence; that women are, like men, pro- 
foundly cultural entities, products of 
society not nature. The original dis- 
tinction between sex and gender 
served to render biology irrelevant to 
a feminist analysis. In the 1980s, that 
distinction itselfhas been challenged, 
but only to accomplish a more com- 
plete effacement of biology. Femi- 
nists of very diverse persuasions 
(Delphy, Wittig, Haraway, Grosz, 
Butler) now agree that "the ostensi- 
bly biological reality that we desig- 
nate as sex is itself an historical con- 
struct and, indeed, a political cat- 
egory" (Butler 261). Bodies are now 
"always already" cultural, to talk of a 
pre-social or biological body has be- 
come a nonsense. In recent feminist 
theory on corporeality and embodi- 
ment, the body is a shell, a surface to 
be inscribed, a terrain to be mapped, 
a discursive fiction. We are encour- 
aged to conceive of the sexed body as 
"discursively produced, elaborated 
as an effect of the social rather than 
its tabula rasa, its prior object." As 
Diana Fuss goes on, our choice is 
between "the essentialist [who] holds 
that the natural is repressed by the 
social [and] theconstructionist [who] 
maintains that the natural is pro- 
duced by the social" (Fuss 3). 
It is testimony to the strength of 
the conceptual opposition between 
essentialism andconstructionism that 
to speak of the body's biology is in- 
variably read as invoking the former, 
Yet, it is not my intention, in raising 
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thequestion about how matter forms, 
to argue for essentialism, or to deny 
the efficacy of the social construe- 
tionist strategy for the contemporary 
feminist project, or even to deny the 
power of cultural forces to shape 
experience, including bodily experi- 
ence. But I would venture to suggest 
that an uncritical notion ofbiology is 
common to both the essentialist and 
the feminist social constructionist 
cum postmodernist, and moreover, 
that neither actually lives with their 
own bodies in the way in which they 
conceive the body to b e t h e r e  is 
something else going on. 
In "Notes Toward a Politics of 
Location," Adrienne Rich observes 
that to think about my body is an 
altogether different proposition from 
thinking about the body: 
Perhaps we need a moratorium 
on saying "the body." For its 
also possible to abstract "then 
body. When I write "the body" 
I see nothing in particular. To 
write "my body" plunges me 
into lived experience, particu- 
larity: I see scars, disfigurements, 
discolourations, damages, losses, 
as well as what pleases me.. . . To 
say "the body" lifts me away 
from what has given me a pri- 
mary perspective. To say "my 
body" reduces the temptation 
to grandiose assertions. (2 15) 
So, while I have no argument with 
the feminist rebuttal of the notion 
that woman is body, I would like to 
remind us that, nonetheless, women 
and men have bodies and that these 
are central to our particular and prac- 
tical experience of our lives. 
By making the body's biology in- 
coherent in feminist theory, I sus- 
pect we have thrown the baby (and 
perhaps most particularly the baby!) 
out with the bath water. Mary 
O'Brien, in The Politics ofReproduc- 
- - 
tion, demonstrates how reproduc- 
tion has been marginalized in both 
"malestream" and feminist theory 
simply by virtue of its designation as 
biological and the particular render- 
ing of biology given by conventional 
social and political philosophies. In 
some ways we have adopted the logic 
of mindbody binarisms, and used 
it, as male scholars in the western 
philosophical tradition have often 
used it in thinking of the male body, 
to oppose and even deny the fact of 
our organic existence. To state the 
obvious: it is far from trivial, for our 
material lives and our intellectual 
preoccupations, that we are biologi- 
Mary O'Brien 
demonstrates how 
reproduction has been 
marginalized in both 
"malestream" and feminist 
theory simply by virtue 
of its designation as 
biological and the 
particular rendering 
of biology given by 
conventional social and 
political philosophies. 
cal organisms, necessarily "natural," 
inextricably a part of "nature" both 
through our participation in organic 
processes and dependence upon natu- 
ral resources. No matter what we 
think about the way we are as hu- 
mans (and the western intellectual 
tradition has elaborate notions of 
what it means to be human and the 
difference between humans and ani- 
mals), we all are born, grow, eat, 
sleep, defecate, age, and die. In this 
context, to elide the biological, to 
argue that it is irrelevant to the truly 
human, the cultural, the social, fails 
to think through something that in- 
timately shapes our lived experience 
and will as inevitably end it all. In the 
end it is not biology which is irrel- 
evant, but our elaborate notions of 
transcendence which are rendered 
irrelevant by us shuffling off this 
mortal coil. 
The question I would ask then, is 
how we might make sense of our 
bodies and our embodied experi- 
ences so as to recognize the organic 
without resorting to biologid de- 
terminism, and the social without 
effecting the disappearance of the 
biological. Given the ascendancy of 
social constructionist perspectives 
within feminism, thequestion has to 
be phrased as how might we conceive 
of biology so as to allow us to take its 
"fact of our existence" seriously and 
examine its interweaving in our so- 
cial lives. What are the possibilities 
of thinking a body's biology differ- 
ently? 
Binary conventions: the self 
against the body 
Clearly reproduction has been 
regarded as quite different from 
other natural hnctions which, 
on the surface, seem to be equally 
imbued with necessity; eating, 
sexuality and dying for example 
share with birth the status of 
biological necessities.. . . They 
have all become the subject 
matters of rather impressive 
bodies ofphilosophical thought 
(dialectical materialism, psycho- 
analytic theory, existentialism). 
The inevitability and necessity 
of these biological events has 
- 
quite clearly not exempted them 
from historical significance. We 
have no comparable philoso- 
phies of birth. (O'Brien 1983, 
20) 
In the tradition of philosophical 
thought to which western feminism 
is heir and antagonist, body has be- 
come profoundly separated from self, 
from mind and soul. A series of 
dualisms reinforce this opposition 
between self and body: mindmat- 
ter, culturelnature, transcendence/ 
immanence, the sociallthe biologi- 
cal. As feminists have frequently 
pointed out, these are not neutral 
distinctions. The binary terms are 
hierarchically ordered and mutually 
exclusive and are frequently mobi- 
lized in the positioning ofwomen as 
inferior and subordinate to men. In 
de~elopin~social and poli tical theory, 
the .negative terms can be dropped 
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from sight. As Mary O'Brien argues, 
the understanding of reproduction 
as merely biological, and the biologi- 
cal as natural, justifies malestream 
philosophical neglect (O'Brien 1 979) 
and the relegation of the reproduc- 
ing body to the narrow perspectives 
of the natural and medical sciences 
(O'Brien 1981,20). 
The result of understanding the 
body through aseries ofdualisms has 
been not simply a philosophical and 
intellectual disregard for the body as 
lived, but the adoption of specific 
attitudes towards the body which we 
take as commonplace and certain. 
The view of biology as a "stable and 
unchanging" phenomenon under- 
writes the tendency for our techno- 
scientific culture to regard the natu- 
ral body as passive, mindless, intran- 
sigent, and in need of regulation. In 
this context, actual body changes 
become disorder (disease) and decay 
(aging). They are to be corrected and 
resisted. In contemporary metaphors 
the body is machine-like+ its actions 
and functions are set. It is, therefore, 
open to being acted upon, to being 
"fured up" when it "goes wrong." It  is 
something that we live with or in, 
rather than something we are. 
- 
There is nothing essential or nec- 
essary in this perspective on the body 
(see Duden). Even so, the specific 
certainties we hold with regard to 
our bodies have consequences, and 
these are particularly evident in our 
interaction with the medical profes- 
sion. 
We go to doctors in order to be 
told what is wrong with our bodies 
and so that we can be "made better." 
Western medicine is heroic in its 
approach: chronic illness, disability, 
and death symbolize its failure 
Wendell 1996,63). Its premise that 
the body can be controlled spills over 
from diseased to healthy bodies. The 
imposition ofaset ofnormative rules 
to the healthy pregnant or labouring 
body, the ease with which chemical 
and surgical interventions are pro- 
posed and acceded to, and the tech- 
nological mediation of our experi- 
ence ofa pregnancy and parturition' 
all bear witness to this very particular 
way the medical profession, and even 
we ourselves, regard our bodies. 
Our certainties about what the 
body is, how it is conceived and 
experienced, how it is lived withlin, 
can also be revealed in the way we 
talk about our bodies and the way we 
treat those who do not have the kind 
of body we deem to be normative. In 
The Woman in the Body, Emily Mar- 
tin points out that women frequently 
As Mary O'Brien argues. 
the understanding of 
reproduction as merely 
biological. and the 
biological as natural. 
justifies malestream 
philosophical neglect 
and the relegation of the 
reproducing body to 
the narrow perspectives 
of the natural 
and medical sciences. 
talkabout menstruation, menopause, 
and labour as ifthese biological expe- 
riences are "separate from the self. 
They are 'the contractions,' 'the hot 
flashes' (not mine); they 'come on': 
women 'get them'" (78). Even more 
revealing is the way our cultural atti- 
tudes towards the body underwrite 
the social oppression of the disabled. 
As Susan Wendell points out, where 
societies embrace the myth that the 
body can be controlled, those who 
cannot do so are seen as failures 
(1 996,93-94). 
It is important to recognize, as 
indeed Wendell does in relation to 
disability, that the effect of the disas- 
sociation of self from body is that 
able-bodied people are alienated from 
their embodied experience and exist- 
ence: "The oppression of disabled 
people is the oppression of every- 
one's red body" (1989, 1 12). 
The implications of this radical 
split between the body and self can 
be very different for men and women. 
With the healthy adult male body as 
norm, men who are not "normal" 
may be treated merely as mindless 
bodies, but women's normal healthy 
bodie can have the same result. Thus, 
in addition to the central concept 
that "your self is separate from your 
body" is both the corollary that the 
body is a given and the notion that 
selfis passive in relation to her body's 
"events." So, awoman's body is talked 
about as something she is subjected 
to, something she must "adjust to or 
cope with," and as something that 
[she] must control. Menstruation, 
menopause, labour, "are states you 
go through, or things which happen 
to you (not actions you do)" (Martin 
77) but equally they are things for 
which you must be responsible and 
over which you must exert self-con- 
trol. The classic example of this con- 
tradiction is the way labouring 
women will be told that the uterine 
contractions are involuntary, and yet 
they can be told to resist the urge to 
push (Martin 63). However, even 
though women's bodies are repre- 
sented as different and problematic, 
they also allow the possibility of 
problemati~in~ comfortable main- 
stream perspectives, of thinking past 
binary constructs which associate the 
mind and self with agency and as- 
sume the body is passive and irrel- 
evant. 
The body in feminist theory 
While feminists have been active 
in developing the critique of the in- 
stitutionalization and medicalization 
ofwomen's bodies, that critique has 
rarely invited a rethink of the funda- 
mental position we take up in regard 
to our bodies. This is most apparent 
when feminists issue theoretical chal- 
lenges to the positioning of women 
on the negative side ofbinaries. What 
we have usually done is to manoeu- 
vre or reposition women on the side 
of goodness and light: on the side of 
culture not nature, mind not body. 
Sometimes feminists (for example, 
in some formulations of ecofemi- 
nism) adopt the strategy of simply 
reversing the value accorded nature 
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culture, mind/body, reason/emotion, 
but whichever strategy, the basic 
dualist framework remains. We chal- 
lenge the position andvalue accorded 
women in dualist hierarchies rather 
than the dichotomies themselves. So, 
for example, we ourselves have ig- 
nored and denied our biologies in 
order to be seen to be equally cultural 
as men, rather than question the 
conceptual frameworkwhich opposes 
the biological and the social. In writ- 
ing of reproduction we reject as un- 
tenable theories which isolate wom- 
en's reproductive capacity as the cause 
of women's oppression (see, for ex- 
ample, Firestone and some readings 
of De Beauvoir) and theorize moth- 
erhood and mothering as a social 
institution unrelated to the bodily 
processes that make us mothers. For 
us, as for the malestream, our biolo- 
gies are an inchoatelincoherent ex- 
perience, beyond the scope oftheory. 
Paradoxically, I believe the same is 
true of recent feminist theory which 
ostensibly takes the body as its sub- 
ject. Indeed it is as if the sudden 
willingness to theorize about the body 
during the mid- and late-1980s 
marks the more complete efface- 
ment of biological sex from dis- 
courses on gender. Against this 
burgeoningofinterest in the body, 
embodiment, and corporeality, is 
an almost scrupulous avoidance 
of the body's substance, its flesh, 
and blood existence. 
Elsewhere, the biological body 
is disposed of much more simply 
(see Thiele). The gaze is exclu- 
sively fixed on the surface and 
scrutiny ofthe depths is constantly 
deferred in what Maxine Sheets- 
Johnstone argues is a "myopic 
cultural conception" (41). The 
surface is privileged because it 
mediates the active and the pas- 
sive, it locates the impact of cul- 
ture on the body.4 
What is disallowed is the possi- 
bility that the body might be ac- 
tive rather than passive. The pos- 
sibility of the body moulding and 
shaping itself, of biologies im- 
pacting on our lived experiences 
and culture, of our bodies as 
sources of meanings and not simply 
the object of them, will remain inad- 
missible "until the surface is seen to 
be the literal outer skin of a far deeper 
and denser bodyn (Sheets-Johnstone 
41). To  ask then how matter forms 
entails a reconfiguration of our con- 
ception of the body and of biology. 
Thinking through the body 
I chose a photograph that shows 
the head in the midst of the 
body.. . .There was some ques- 
tion about the suitability of us- 
ing this picture. Some people 
find the picture gross .... Of 
course, that uncanny little head 
is surrounded by body for but a 
brief pause in an irrepressible 
progress. Things will soon be 
sorted out into their proper cat- 
egories; mother, baby, doctor, 
nurse. At this point in history, 
thinking through the body only 
occurs in brief intervals, soon to 
be reabsorbed by the powerhl 
narratives of mind over matter. 
Like the photograph, I want to 
catch and hold on to those mo- 
ments when something else oc- 
curs. (Gallop 8-9) 
Jane Gallop is right to point out to 
those moments when someting else 
occurs, and there are moments where 
something different has been done 
with the body in feminist theory. For 
me, the first crucial "moment* was 
the reconceptualization of reproduc- 
tion achieved by Mary O'Brien in 
The Politics of Reproduction (1 98 1). 
In an avowedly materialist project, 
O'Brien presented a way out of the 
impasse reached in the late '70s as 
marxist-feminists struggled to find a 
materialist basis for patriarchy which 
did not imply "biological reproduc- 
tion." She pointed out that repro- 
duction was as complex bio-social 
process rather than a mere biological 
event, and with that insight launched 
- 
into an analysis of reproduction as 
material, historical, and dialectical. 
Unlike previous feminist discussions 
of reproduction, this conceptuali- 
zation retains both the biological and 
the social, and admits the possibility 
of culture working out, in histori- 
cally specific ways, the exigencies set 
by reproductive difference. Refig- 
uring biology as process departs from 
the notion that it is fixed and un- 
changing,5 and opens the way for a 
consideration, not only ofpregnancy 
and labour but also the common- 
place minutia of bodily changes 
which we all experience as we grow 
and age, as we fall ill and regain 
health, as we feel more or less fit and 
well, as we menstruate or experience 
menopause, and as we confront more 
serious and permanent disablement 
through injury, chronic illness, or 
old age. It is here, in amongst this 
minutia of change and process that I 
believe the potential lies to regard an 
individual biology as profoundly in- 
determinate in itselfand in its inter- 
action with a society, and, for that 
reason, to admit biology-our flesh 
and blood existence--to discourses 
on embodiment. 
For me, it was the experience of 
pregnancy and labour in the flesh 
(and not just through the pages of a 
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book on theory) which sharpened 
my sense of the bio-social as a proc- 
ess. O'Brien opened a door and let 
me see the world different. Living 
that first pregnancy and birth 
grounded her theoretical perspective 
in my experience. Not only did the 
experience ofbearing and giving birth 
to Anna cross the boundary between 
body and society, but it also made 
more evident for me that the inter- 
play is not a one-way process; that it 
is possible and important to admit 
the body's agency. The body can 
surprise, it is capable of resisting and 
disrupting cultural agendas, it can be 
a source of meanings not just sub- 
jected to meanings. 
There are several other reasons 
why my pregnancy, rather than re- 
flection on any of my short-term or 
more chronic illnesses, lent itself to 
this project. T o  begin with, as Iris 
Young notes, "pregnant existence 
entails . , . a unique temporality of 
process and growth" which challenges 
traditional assumptions of a unified 
subject and the distinction between 
immanence and transcendence. It is 
"a paradigm of bodily experience in 
which the transparent unity of self 
dissolves and the body attends posi- 
tively to itselfat the same time that it 
enacts itsprojects" (Young 160-161). 
Given the privilege we accord 
mind, it is hardly surprising that I 
should have sat down to first write 
this in my thirty-seventh year. With 
a few exceptions whose implications 
were effectively ignored, my younger 
body was a relatively comfortable 
thing. By that I mean that it was 
commonplace, so taken for granted 
and unremarkable as to be largely 
invisible in daily life. If it imposed on 
my consciousness at all it was as 
interruptionldisruption (how often 
did I hold off going to eat, to sleep, to 
the loo, in order to finish some task); 
as inconveniencelburden (illness, 
regular severe pre-menstrual cramps, 
the occasional headache preventing 
the pursuit of previous plans and 
rhythms in my life); and as transient 
physical pleasures (the delicious sense 
of somnolence, sexual arousal, and 
orgasm, the rhythm of movement). 
But my first-time pregnant bodywas 
not something I found I could take 
for granted, or temporarily forget. It 
constantly impinged on my con- 
sciousness because of its novel, im- 
mediate, dramatic, and continual 
transformation. A sense of transfor- 
mation which I lived with from then 
until now, seven years and a second 
child later. I am still awaiting a sense 
of having my body wholly back to 
myself! 
I certainly found pregnancy and 
labour a fascinating and pleasurable 
experience and this undoubtedly 
contributed to thepossibilityofposi- 
tively attending to my body's proc- 
esses. But not all women choose their 
pregnancies, or experience their preg- 
nancies with pleasure, or have the 
desire or opportunity which I had to 
labour in my own home, in my own 
way, and in my own time. My expe- 
rience simply cannot stand as repre- 
sentative for all women, it cannot 
even stand as normative. I was lucky 
to have chosen my pregnancy and to 
have escaped some of the more alien- 
ating and destructive possibilities of 
the medicalization of childbirth, and 
even the physiology of pregnancy. 
Nonetheless, whatever the particular 
configuration of an individual preg- 
nancy and birth, it is unlike other 
bodily experiences in that its project 
is the creation of another, of what 
becomes not-me from me. This, more 
so than pain, ill- 
ness or disable- 
ment, can become 
a project in which 
a woman may 
positively attend 
to her bodily proc- 
esses. 
While not all 
women, and given 
the medical model 
not even a major- 
ity ofwomen, will 
experience their 
pregnancies as a 
challenge to the 
alienation ofone's 
self from one's 
body it seems to 
me that it has a 
greater potential to do so because, as 
As Young says, rather than the preg- 
nant body disrupting the selfs 
projects, the body is that project 
(160-61). And as Mary O'Brien 
would have added, even if, like the 
bee, she cannot help what she is 
doing, "unlike the bee, she knows 
that her product, like herself, will 
have a history . . . and knows what 
she is doing" (1981, 38). 
In the remainder of this paper 
- - 
then I want to use my account of my 
pregnancy and labour to think 
through the question of how we 
might think differently about our 
bodies. Firstly, I want to take up 
Mary O'Brien's point that biology is 
a process, not event, to challenge the 
assertion that essentialism must fol- 
low from taking biology seriously. In 
doing this we can rethink the body 
and its biology as active and that in 
doing so we also have the opportu- 
nity to think of it as undetermined, 
in any essentialist way. Thus we need 
not fear "that its ineluctable imme- 
diacy will leave us no space for 
changen (Kirby 7-g), rather our task 
is the constant and daily creation of 
ourselves in relation with our bodies. 
Secondly I take issue with feminist 
theories ofembodiment. I argue that 
the body is not a mere recipient of 
cultural inscriptions and disciplines, 
rather it sets ever-changing agendas 
which shape and are shaped by cul- 
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tural actslinscriptions, and which can 
also interrupt and resist specific in- 
scriptions we and others might seek 
to discipline our bodies towards. The 
body's biology is more a source and 
resource than merely an object. What 
this paper does not do, although it 
suggests the need to do so, is examine 
the implications ofa reconceptualid 
(biological) body for our concep- 
tions of the self. It is clear that no- 
tions of the body are implicated in 
particular conceptions of the self 
whether as humanist subject or dis- 
cursively constructed multiple 
subjectivities. Retheorizing the body 
in order to dissolve the opposition 
between self and body does not do 
away with the question of the rela- 
tionship between the two. It simply 
makes it more interesting.6 
The body in process 
There are a thousand ways of 
living a pregnancy, of having or 
not having a relationship of an- 
other intensity with this still 
invisible other. Really experi- 
encing metamorphosis. Several, 
other, and unforeseeable. That 
cannot but inscribe in the body 
the good possibility of an altera- 
tion. It is not only a question of 
the feminine body's extra re- 
source, this specific power to 
produce some thing living of 
which her flesh is the locus, not 
only a question of a transforma- 
tion of rhythms, exchanges, or 
relationship to space, of the 
whole perceptive system, but 
also of the irreplaceable experi- 
ence ofthose moments ofstress, 
ofthe body's crises, ofthat work 
that goes on peacefully for a 
long time only to burst out in 
that surpassing moment, the 
time of childbirth. In which she 
lives as if she were larger or 
stronger than herself. It is also 
the experience of a "bondn with 
the other, all that comes through 
in the metaphor ofbringing into 
the world. How could the wo- 
man, who has experienced the 
not-me within me, not have a 
particular relationship to the 
written? To writing as giving 
itself away (cutting itself off) 
from the source? (Cixous 90) 
Pregnancy has a way of dramati- 
cally bringing home to you that your 
biological state is by no means fixed. 
Firstly there is the dramatic bodily 
transformation evoked in Cixous' 
phrase "really experiencing metarnor- 
A pregnant woman lives 
with uncertainty, with 
the unknown, with their 
own particular and 
intimate process. The 
transformation is 
both physiological and 
existential. It exposes 
the ambiguities of 
self-body and 
self-other relations. 
phosis." Everything changes and 
changes again. What I felt one day, 
one week, one trimester changed in 
the next fav days, weeks, in later 
trimesters. Pregnancy was a well- 
spring of unanticipated and unim- 
aginedsensations, ofunpredicted and 
unforeseeable moments: the hard- 
ness of my belly; my body's specific 
dislikes; its capacity to reactlrecover 
(look adsmell food, throw up, then 
eat the food); the immediacy, the 
urgency of "the hungries" and "the 
sleepies," almost a refusal ofthe body 
to be denied or regulated; the con- 
stant changing shape and texture and 
sense of my body; its well-being; the 
wonder and the inexplicable sense of 
the interior.. . . ~he-re was the day 
when, four months pregnant, I was 
lecturing and glanced down at my 
notes to  discover my breasts 
practicing lactation all down the front 
of my shirt, the same day that laugh- 
ter shot two buttons from my skirt. 
There is no stasis or constancy in 
pregnancy, there is not even a cer- 
tainty of outcome. The ever-present 
possibility of miscarriage, decisions 
to be made about abortion, the pos- 
sibility ofpremature labour, ofbeing 
defined as "overduen and induced, 
the chances of a cesarean. A pregnant 
woman lives with uncertainty, with 
the unknown, with their own par- 
ticular and intimate process. The 
transformation is both physiological 
andexistential. Not onlydoes it throw 
into dramatic relief the processes of 
one's biology, it also exposes the 
ambiguities of self-body and self- 
other relations. 
Experiencing one's insides as "be- 
longing to another, another that is 
nevertheless my bodyn (Young 163) 
is itselfsomething that only becomes 
definite over time. The separation 
between my self and the fetus within 
was gradually and subtly accom- 
plished: "Are you feeling movements 
yet?" "Well, that depends on what 
movements feel like, is that flutter it 
or me?" The certainty of the not-me 
as not me had to await the stretching, 
- 
somersaults, hiccoughs, poking me- 
poking "itn sensations of late preg- 
nancy. Even the increasing recogni- 
tion of the fetus as not me, as inside 
and other, does not detract from the 
heightened sensitivity to my body 
which increases as pregnancy 
progresses. While I am not privy to 
what my fetus feels, the exterior evi- 
dence of movement and the interior 
sensation of the other alive within 
fractures the simple interiorlexterior 
of the body into intimate multiples. 
When I touch myself I feel it on two 
surfaces. When I touch another, I 
feel it just the once and this is how 
others, if they are lucky, may feel the 
fetus move. But when I touch the 
other that is within I can feel it on my 
inside, and my outside, through both 
sides of my belly and on my hand. 
The bodily process ofpregnancy is 
sharply collapsed by the drama of 
childbirth. I have no visual images of 
my labouring body, only an interior 
account ofthe hard work, the rhythm 
of effortlendurance and restlrespite. 
Only once or twice did I feel out of 
kilter with my body, overwhelmed 
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by a contraction that came "too 
soon," before "I" was ready. For the 
most part I laboured to give birth to 
this child withlinlthrough my body. 
Even here my body could surprise 
me. It set the terms of my labour: the 
anterior lip which resisted effice- 
ment for four or five hours wasn't 
"myn idea and I remember demand- 
ing of the form within "don't you 
want to be born?" Ilmy body had 
capacities and resources that amazed 
me: blessed endorphins, I swear I 
slept for 20 minutes at a time, be- 
tween regular three-minute contrac- 
tions. In labour I found a sense of 
being within the body that made the 
outside, even the outside of my own 
body, barely comprehensible: My 
birthing time and dock time were so 
mismatched that afterwards I could 
not tally it against the midwife's birth 
record; her reading of my body as 
tiring and needing rest contrasted 
sharply with my interior sense of not 
being tired at all; with all the pressure 
directed towards my anus I could not 
locate my cervix, had no sense of the 
labias stretching around the head, 
and didn't feel myself tearing (I was 
sure going to shit this baby out). The 
last contraction came as a complete 
surprise. 
~ n n a  did not pause on entering 
the world. Suddenly it was over, and 
immediately I could not recall that 
particular quality of pain that is a 
contraction. In the moment between 
intense pain and no pain, thesolidity 
of my stomach, which had finally 
become familiar, was transformed 
into blancmange. The direction and 
force of contractions, muscle effort, 
and will disappeared in the mush. 
Nor do bodily transformations end 
with the dramatic transformation 
accomplished in the birth.Ai5erward.s 
is the long long process ofhealing, of 
new bodily processes focused on the 
breasts and lactation and, for me, the 
long, long process ofcoming to terms 
with a body which looks different, 
feels different, reacts and responds 
differently. 
Not only does my body change in 
dramatic and unforeseen ways but its 
changes are not the same configura- 
tion for other pregnantwomen, other 
pregnancies. Indeed, the diversity of 
pregnant embodiment is an object 
lesson in biology as process: it points 
towards the incredible diversity and 
uncertainties in a biological process 
which both resists attempts to define 
a normative bodily experience, and 
interacts in very complex ways with 
the (more familiar) diversity ofsocial 
contexts. Pregnancy may progress 
Pregnancy and labour is 
a complex biological 
process lived out in an 
equally complex set 
of social relations. In 
those multiple 
complexities there is 
ample scope for seeing 
biology as having an 
undetermined and active 
relation with the social. 
through a myriad of possible physi- 
cal expressions from an incredible 
sense of well-being to chronic dis- 
comfort. I had nausea for a couple of 
months, an acquaintance had it for 
all nine months; another had severe 
sciatic nerve pain, another 
hemorrhoids, I had indigestion, I 
pulled muscles willy-nilly. Some 
women feel exuberantly randy 
throughout pregnancy, some for pe- 
riods of the pregnancy, others not 
all. Their labours may be anything 
from easy to impossible and the out- 
come, unknown and uncertain. In 
this way the diversity of possibilities 
in the body renders it unpredictable 
and unforeseeable and in that sense 
indeterminate. 
The diversity in the biological proc- 
ess is compounded by the diverse 
socialcircumstances inwhich women 
become pregnant, live out their preg- 
nancies, give birth and care for chil- 
dren. Each compounds the other. So 
women may confront a pregnancy 
that was planned or unanticipated; 
they may reactwith pleasure, or anxi- 
ety, or distress; their particular physi- 
ological pregnancy may have a vari- 
ety of social consequences and costs; 
their social relations, financial cir- 
cumstances, interactions with the 
medical institutions may be more or 
less enabling; their births may be 
good or bad, with a lot or little inter- 
vention; their post-natal recovery may 
be easy or difficult. 
Pregnancy and labour is a com- 
plex biological process lived out in an 
equally complex set of social rela- 
tions. In those multiple complexities 
there is ample scope for seeing biol- 
ogy as having an undetermined and 
active relation with the social: for 
understanding the relation between 
the two as an interactionlinterweav- 
ing in which the biological can alter 
social experience and the social can 
alter biological experience. In this 
way it is possible to contemplate 
biology but escape biological deter- 
minism and contemplate the social 
without completely effacing the bio- 
logid.  
The active body 
. . . the pregant woman experi- 
ences herself as a source and 
participant in a creative process. 
Though she does not plan and 
direct it, neither does it merely 
wash over her; rather she is this 
process, this change. (Young 
167) 
T o  be sure childbirth is hard 
and often painful labour, a 
strenuous task peculiarly un- 
suited to being performed un- 
derahalo, but, equally clearly, it 
is a social and cultural affair . . . 
a celebration and a rite. (O'Brien 
1981, 9-19) 
Pregnancy and labour then, are 
not just inscribed but lived. Rather 
than being passive the body itself is 
setting an agenda, defining a process 
and a pace. To argue that this body 
agenda is somehow "always alreadyn 
socially constituted is to miss the 
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point that rhc body is full of sur- 
prises. It  is to foreclose any discus- 
sion of the implications for "realn 
lives of their body processes (see, for 
example, Fuss 15-19). For me, one 
of the acute consequences of repro- 
ductive process was having to self- 
consciously live with not knowing, 
in any specific way, what was going 
to happen next and what it would be 
like. This is a condition of our exist- 
ence, but rather than filling the fu- 
ture's void with plans on the as- 
sumption that everything was possi- 
ble, I found myselfconstantly defer- 
ring making plans and taking deci- 
sions simply because I did not know 
what wouldcome next, what it would 
be like next week, next month, at the 
birth, after the birth, what the child 
would be, would be like, and how it 
would shape the configuration ofmy 
life from the morning afier.7 The 
sheer unpredictability-of it all sub- 
verts the kind of self-control and 
social control we take for granted. 
The drama of pregnancy does not 
stand as merely a special case, but 
figures as a reminder of the intricate 
interweaving of ourselves as biologi- 
cal organisms and social beings. I 
have discovered, for example, that I 
can no longer, and probably should 
never have taken my habitual sexual 
responses for granted. In the two 
years &er the birth I went from 
placid complacency to impatience to 
despair awaiting a "return to nor- 
mal" sexual responsiveness. I have 
had to come to terms with the fact 
that my body has changed, that my 
desire, arousal, and orgasms are 
configured very differently from be- 
fore and that my body and I, I in my 
body, must now invent anew 
(reconfigure) my sexual pleasures. 
Under the rules of binaries, recog- 
nizing the body's agency usually 
means positioning the self as passive. 
I find it very easy, in confronting the 
post-partum "sexual droughtn8 to see 
how one might position one's self as 
the victim of one's bodily process to 
see the body as actingagainst the self, 
or in spite of the self. But it also 
makes plain the pointlessness of the 
opposition. The body and selfare "in 
it together," both in terms of the 
probiem and the solutions. 
T o  try and think differently 
through our bodies is difficult. Both 
biological mischance and powerful 
institutional practices can make many 
women's grip on themselves as crea- 
tive process tenuous indeed. Review- 
ing Emily Martin'swork, Ruth Behar 
records her experience of a forceps 
delivery following 60 hours ofposte- 
rior labour. After writing ofher sense 
ofdemoralization after the birth and 
her feeling that her body had failed 
her, she observed: 
Emily Martin would object to 
the way in these lines I have 
separated myself from the act of 
labouring, my body from me, 
the woman. Avoid the passive 
voice, guidelines for proper jour- 
nal writing often tell us. Labour 
is like a hand you are dealt, the 
midwives told me when I came 
in to the hospital after my wa- 
ters broke. Is there a passive 
voice that is not the voice of 
defeat but the voice of coming 
to terms with the hand you are 
dealt? Is there an active voice 
that keeps a memory of that 
passive voice? (735) 
But, if "labour is a hand you are 
dealtn it is inseparable from how you 
play it. There is a world of difference 
between labouring in circumstances 
where the labour is actively managed 
for the woman's comfort and in ac- 
cordance with her wishes (however 
those may change while engaged in 
the process) and where it is not. Is 
there a voice which merges endur- 
ance and management? Is there a 
way of thinking about ourselves as 
our bodies that merges the active and 
passive? 
It is not only the negotiation of the 
self and the body around notions of 
agency and passivity which is at stake 
but also the positioning of the body 
vis-a-vis social practices. Recogniz- 
ing the body's agency makes it possi- 
ble for us to acknowledge that the 
body can disrupt social inscriptions. 
It allows the body to be understood 
not only as a source of experience 
and as setting agendas, but also as a 
resource for resistance, as a source of 
new meanings. In the potential of 
the body to resist and disrupt social 
inscriptions lies the radical implica- 
tion of Diana Fuss asking how es- 
sences change and social COnStNC- 
tions are normative. I, for example, 
never knew that when you were preg- 
nant your belly was not "soft." After 
all, it is supposed to represent all that 
is feminine, to woke the quintessen- 
tial female. I was amazed to find, 
almost immediately on becoming 
pregnant, that my stomach felt like a 
plank ofwood and this tautness and 
hardness did not waver (it simply 
transformed from plank to boulder) 
until Anna was born and the belly 
turnedinstant blancmange. This body 
sense is decidedly at odds with repre- 
sentations of pregnant women (as 
soh, fragile, diseased, needing to take 
care, be cosseted) and, for me, it 
helped challenge and displace those 
representations. Moreover, on more 
than one occasion it provided the 
resource to resist particular inscrip- 
tions. Once, as I stood barefoot and 
very pregnant at the photocopier, a 
work colleague (male, Catholic) com- 
mentedappreciatively that pregnancy 
made me look soft and vulnerable. 
The body belly-laughed. How, said 
I, as a father of four, had he managed 
to escape noticing that the pregnant 
body was not soft but hard as wood, 
solid as rock, and that far from vul- 
nerable, it made me feel stronger and 
weller and more energetic than I had 
ever felt before or after! (Patriarchy 
retreated in conhsion.) In a similar 
vein, body sense underpins a preg- 
nant woman's protest to those who 
would cosset her ("but I am not 
sick") and can provide a basis for 
resisting medical definitions of her- 
self, her pregnancy, and her labour. 
As Cixous writes in Sorties: 
The relation bourne to the child 
must . . . be rethought.. . . Rather 
than depriving woman of a fas- 
cinating time in the life of her 
body just to guard against pro- 
creation's being recuperated [by 
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phallocentrism] , lets de-mater- 
paternalize. Let's defetishize.. . . 
We are not going to r e h e  our- 
selves the delights of a preg- 
nancy, which, moreover, is al- 
ways dramatized or evaded or 
cursed in classical texts. For if 
there is a specific thing repressed, 
that is where it is found: the 
taboo of the pregnant woman 
(which says alot about the power 
that seems invested in her). It is 
because they have always sus- 
pected that the pregnant woman 
not only doubles her market 
value but, especially, valorizes 
herself as a woman in her own 
eyes, and undeniably takes on 
weight and sex. (90) 
Conclusion 
The argument presented here is 
specifically aimed at claiming the 
body's biology as a feminist subject. 
It continues the conversation started 
when Mary O'Brien pointed out that 
reproduction was a complex process 
incorporating both biological and 
social moments. We can escape the 
tension between a dominant social 
constructionist orientation and a fear 
of essentialism which bedevils femi- 
nism, by recognizing that the body's 
biology is not fixed and is as hnda- 
mental to my being in the world as 
the culture through which I inter- 
pret myself and my experiences. The 
body is produced in and produces 
the social. Moving beyond the con- 
fines of that increasingly infertile 
opposition between biology and so- 
ciety would seem desirable, and not 
least for the opportunity it provides 
to discard rigid and normalizingcon- 
structions of the body. This wom- 
an's body may bean infant's, achild's, 
an adolescent's, or an adult's body. It 
may be a fertile or infertile body, a 
pregnant body, a menopausal or post- 
menopausal body, an ill body, a well 
body, an aging body. It is not a man's 
body for all that there will be times 
when, in a society in which men's 
bodies and men's lives are norma- 
tive, it may pass as if it were a man's 
body. Those occasions when it can- 
not pass are among those which give 
us a chance to get at "those moments 
when something else occurs" (Gal- 
lop 9) but which we all too often try 
to disguise and deny. Through them 
perhaps we can begin to theorize 
embodiment beyond the surface, 
radically shift our culture's precon- 
ceptions ofwomen's and men's bod- 
ies, and begin to understand how 
"forms matter, ... and ... matter 
forms." (Brodbribb 147) 
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'Such determinist readings are evi- 
dent in the socio-biological project 
of reducing social structure to an 
expression of our genes; or the popu- 
lar genetics project of hypothesizing 
the existence of a math gene particu- 
lar to boys to explain why women 
can't do math; or the research into 
PMS which points to the way wom- 
en's work suffers during their men- 
strual cycle, as if men's work never 
suffers from their headaches or 
hemorrhoids or hangovers. 
2 ~ m i l y  Martin, in her book,The 
Woman in the Body, develops this 
medical metaphor of the body as a 
machine to incorporate reproduc- 
tion and the entire process of work 
which the doctor and the woman is 
involved in the management of preg- 
nancy and labour. The metaphor she 
suggests is that of the factory, the 
productive process, and the product. 
3Barbara Duden suggests several con- 
sequences of the routine reliance on 
"techniques of visualization" (e.g. 
ultrasound): it enables the fetus to 
become mentally "disembedded from 
the interior, from the innards of a 
woman and [to become] an agent in 
itself," to acquire "personhood, 
rights, patienthood and so on"; it 
"disempowers or incapacitates 
women to trust their own senses" in 
that they may not feel that every- 
thing is alright unless they can see it, 
unless they are continually moni- 
tored, and the same may be true of 
midwives and doctors who come to 
rely on the machine and sight to tell 
them what they used to deduce from 
their own senses and experiences. 
See also Iris Young who speaks of the 
way "the use of instruments provides 
a means of objectifying the preg- 
nancy and birth that alienates a 
woman because it negates or deval- 
ues her own experience ofthose proc- 
esses" (170). 
4 ~ h i s  urface tension can be pre- 
served even in the face of the body's 
"insides": I have, for example, heard 
Liz Grosz, in discussion following a 
public lecture on "Lesbian Desire" 
which she presented at Murdoch 
University, August 1992, respond to 
a question about the need to recog- 
nize the interior of the body by ex- 
plaining that a surface has two sides! 
5Although it is still possible to con- 
ceive of it as fixed in process. This is 
the case with evolutionary models of 
changewhere feminist biologists have 
challenged the notion of biology as 
passive by pointing to the capacity of 
the organism to evolve. See, for ex- 
ample, Nancy Tuana's work. None- 
theless, it is not only on the scale of 
evolutionary time that biology 
changes but also within the scale of a 
lifetime. 
G ~ s  Sally Gadow observes: "Let us 
grant for a moment that the critique 
succeeds in showing that the essence 
of human existence is embodiment, 
that the self is inseparable from the 
body, and that philosophy can no 
longer address problems of mind and 
consciousness in abstraction from 
their existential ground, the body. 
Even when we grant this the prob- 
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lem of the relation between the self 
and body is not solved; it only be- 
comes more interesting. Body and 
self, though inseparable, are not iden- 
tical" (86). 
'The desires and hardly hoped for 
dreams ofpregnancysuggest this lack 
of knowing and wanting to know: 
Unlike many of my contemporaries 
I did not avail myself of either ultra- 
sound or arnniocentisis so I did not 
know the sex ofmy foetus or if it was 
free of particular genetic conditions. 
For nine months I lived with the 
refrain: "Please be a girl, it'll be al- 
right if its a boy but oh so much 
better to be a girl; please be well, it'll 
be alright solongas its born alive, but 
oh so much better to be healthy, be 
clever, be good." Even had I known 
it would indeed be agirl and healthy, 
I could not predict whether it would 
be free of colic or not, sleep reason- 
able hours or not, require special 
care, nor could I have predicted my 
own responses to having a child to 
care for and the redirection of my 
own ambitions and attitudes. 
*A week or so after the birth, my 
partner was asked by a colleague how 
were we "coping with the sexual 
drought." At the time we were out- 
raged at the implication that defer- 
ring sexual intercourse until tears 
healed, new routines and tiredness 
became more manageable etc, was 
an unwarranted imposition upon the 
male partner. Now, we are inclined 
to view the remark somewhat differ- 
ently, together with the euphemistic 
treatment ofsex in ante-natal classes: 
"Afterwards your partner may feel 
unloved." Ha! 
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